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ABSTRACT
An attempt is made to simulate the disclosure of under-
ground soldiers in terms of theory of networks. The coupling
mechanism between the network nodes is the possibility that
a disclosed soldier is going to disclose also his acquaintances.
We calculate the fraction of disclosed soldiers as dependent
on the fraction of those who, once disclosed, reveal also
their colleagues. The simulation is immersed in the historical
context of the Polish Home Army under the communist rule
in 1946-49.
INTRODUCTION
In the long-lasting discussion about how predictions are or
may be possible in social sciences (Popper 1963, Moss &
Edmonds 2005, Silver 2012) scholars agree that the conditions
of a successful prediction are tough and rarely satisfied. In
(Popper 1966), the following warning has been formulated
by Karl Popper: ‘science can predict the future only if the
future is predetermined—if, as it were, the future is present in
the past, telescoped in it’. This means in particular, that the
system to be predicted should remain stationary and isolated
from external factors which could destroy the accuracy of the
intended prediction. As stated by Popper, these requirements
are not met by the modern society. In more recent writings
and presentations (Moss & Edmonds 2005, Edmonds 2014),
Bruce Edmonds indicates that predictive models of complex
(as social) systems are rare, and that models which only
pretend to be predictive can actually be dangerous in untrained
hands of stakeholders. In the conclusions of an influential
book on predictions (Silver 2012), Nate Silver writes: ‘There
is no reason to conclude that the affairs of men are becoming
more predictable. (...) The same sciences that uncover the
laws of nature are making the organization of society more
complex’. The power of the Silver’s method seems to be a
very careful data analysis for issues where a prediction is
possible, leaving other issues aside, and his mastery is to
distinguish these two kinds. Adherents of social simulations
often provide sets of rules, which have to be complied with
to get a credible outcome (Moss & Edmonds 2005, Helbing
& Balietti 2011, Edmonds & Meyer 2013). When faced with
these warnings and caveats, it is tempting to expand the list
of examples, yet short, where a prediction is possible.
We are going to discuss a situation when the complexity
of decisions is limited by the pressure of an external power.
Once basic human needs are threated, one can expect that main
interest and activity will be directed to minimize the threat. In
particular, when an individual’s safety is at risk in conditions
of limited information, the strategy of minimizing the maximal
loss (minimax) is the most straightforward solution. In our
case, this strategy was equivalent to an active collaboration
with the regime. This is our main assumption here. On the
contrary to many social phenomena, here the context makes
the problem simpler.
We propose to consider a historical example: the social
network of soldiers of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa,
AK) in Poland, conscripted to regular army under Soviet
command in late 40’s. In this network, node X is connected
to node Y (a link from X to Y) if X knows the partisan
activity of Y. Accordingly, X can inform against Y to the
communist security service. The problem of the fraction of
soldiers who will be revealed is discussed here in the frames
of the percolation theory on networks (Stauffer & Aharony
1992, Newman 2002, Hamilton & Pryadko 2014). Although
these frames are clearly more wide, than the particular issue
taken from history of Poland, we concentrate on this example
to include the cognitive and social contexts (Edmonds 2012)
to the model. In our case, these are: the Stalinist reality
encoded in norms and expectations, and the relations of power.
Although the generality of the model approach is narrowed in
this way, these contexts allow to fix and justify the model
assumptions.
The aim of this work is an analysis of the time evolution of
the political attitudes of the soldiers, with particular attention
to the conformist behavior of some of them with respect to the
communist power. Although this problem is precisely located
in the past history, it is relevant for similar phenomena, both
those in more remote and those in more contemporary times.
In our case, we are going to trace the path from a partisan of
the Polish Underground State to an informer of the communist
secret police.
Our method includes a reconstruction of personal power
networks (PPN) of the soldiers, based on writings of Polish
historians (Kersten 1991, Tkaczew 2007, Wieliczka-Szarkowa
2013). This step is motivated by the concept of figurations,
as introduced by Norbert Elias (Elias 1978). By a personal
power network of node X we mean a set of ties to X from
persons who have some kind of power over X. Links in these
networks mean the relations of power of different kinds, from
a threat of life to a referent power including, in a broader
sense, family ties. Subsequent decisions of the soldiers are
described in terms of the decision trees (Gladwin 1989), with
information—at their time—incomplete.
In the next two sections we make an attempt to highlight
the context. Further, we try to reconstruct the personal power
networks of a soldier, and we propose a scheme of questions
which should be posed to know if a respondent is going
to disclose himself as an ex-partisan, to join the communist
party and to inform about his colleagues. This scheme is
presented as a decision tree. We analyse briefly what could
be the answers, provided that the respondent tries to minimize
his maximal loss and that he tells true. The coupling of the
soldiers’ decisions makes a space for a simulation, performed
in terms of theory of networks. Final conclusions close the
text.
THE COGNITIVE CONTEXT: THE STALINIST
REALITY
In 1943, the underground AK in Poland had about 200
thousands of soldiers (Kersten 1991). Fighting against the
Germans, some AK groups happened to cooperate with the
Red Army; yet, as the front moved west, these groups were
disarmed by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs
(NKVD). The AK privates have been directed to the Polish
military units (WP) fighting against the Germans under Soviet
command, the AK officers have been arrested. Military actions
of AK against the Red Army has been ruled out by the AK
headquarters. In May 1944, the Soviet authorities ordered a
general mobilization of all Polish men between 18 and 55
years old. In July 1944, Polish communist security forces of
about 20 thousands have been created by NKVD. Both these
bodies concentrated on chasing after AK soldiers; between
July and December 1944, about 30 thousands of them were
arrested. New penal code of WP allowed to try civilians in
political cases, with the death penalty for having a radio or
for not informing the communist authorities about what what
the latters considered as ‘criminal’ actions.
In July 1945, an amnesty was declared, which however did
not apply to commanders who did not disclosed themselves
and their subordinates. Some AK high-rank commanders ac-
cepted the amnesty conditions and asked others to disclose.
In June 1946, a referendum was carried out to prove national
support for the communists, and the results were falsified by
them. In January 1947, national elections have been organized,
with simultaneous terror, arrests and murders of political
opponents. One month later, the second amnesty released
about 25 thousands of prisoners sentenced for less than 5
years. Those who disclosed themselves were promised to set
free. In summer 1948, the disclosed soldiers have been arrested
again, many of them subjected to torture during investigations.
Parallel to these processes, the communist policy evolved
from the coalition of all ‘non-fascist’ parties in 1945, with AK
excluded as a fascist one, to a split and gradual elimination
of the agrarian Christian democrats (PSL) and the socialists
(PPS). Finally a split of the communist party itself (PPR)
appeared, and its moderate faction has been deprived of power
in 1948. The remains of PPS were absorbed by PPR in 1948.
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT: THE RELATIONS OF
POWER
In each army unit in Poland, the counter-intelligence objec-
tives are performed mainly by the security officer, appointed to
protect the unit (obiektowy oficer informacji, OOI); this role
has not changed since 1945 (Tkaczew 2007). Everywhere in
the world, the task of counter-intelligence officers is to know
everything what could be important for the security of actions.
In WP in the 40’s, this role was understood as to eliminate ‘the
hostile element’. Between October 1944 and October 1946,
soldiers of AK were qualified to this category by definition;
the same practice was renewed after October 1947. Persons in
this category have been subjected to a continuous investigation,
their promotions have been blocked or delayed, and often they
were dismissed from the army.
OOI has been responsible for the control of political conduct
of all soldiers, except the unit commander. Yet, although OOI’s
have been obliged to inform the unit commander about his
results, the content of this information had to be arranged
within the political section, a kind of a state in a state. It
was the duty of OOI’s to collect a set of unofficial informers
(nieoficjalny współpracownik, NW). Basically, the network
of NW’s could not contain loops; NW’s did not know each
other, then nobody knew if his colleague or interlocutor was
going to denounce him to communist authorities. OOI’s have
been controlled precisely, and they had to carry out a detailed
documentation of all their actions. OOI’s have been assessed;
an inefficient officer could be dismissed or even sentenced to
imprisonment (Tkaczew 2007). Their work was also accounted
for by PPR; a refusal to join this party automatically qualified
an OOI as a hostile element. Therefore, the fraction of OOI’s
who were PPR members increased from 51 in December 1946
to 88 in December 1948. We note also that central command
of the information service has been controlled by the officers
of counter-intelligence agencies of the Red Army (SMERSH).
These facts indicate, that OOI’s have been played a main
role in the personal power networks of our set of AK sol-
diers in WP. Their power—the ability to influence soldiers’
actions—was greater than the power of the commanders, as
the rules of the latter were commonly known and limited by
detailed military regulations.
PERSONAL POWER NETWORKS
A PPN for a soldier of AK can be reconstructed only as
a standard one; we assume that the variations of PPN’s from
one soldier to another can be taken into account only in the
statistical sense, as explained below. The list of ties in such
PPN of a soldier includes his direct commander and his OOI,
but also his subordinates, his family and—last but not least—
his acquaintances from AK. Although contacts with the last
group have been certainly less vivid, the awareness about a
possible threat of their disclosure was certainly unrelenting.
Actually, these latter ties are the only essential ones for the
dynamics of our system. The ties with the family can be
qualified as the referent power (Marshall 1998); they have
provided a motivation to live, to protect these nears and dears,
to plan the future, to make a career. On the other hand, the ties
with the commander and even more with OOI have ensured
that once a soldier broke the communist rule or would be
denounced, his career, his freedom and perhaps even his life
are finished. (Here there is no need to specify the details of
fates of those accused and condemned.) Both these kinds of
ties do not constitute independent variables, but rather they
should be treated as the context. The ties with the subordinates
in WP can be roughly qualified into the two above contextual
kinds. The actual evolution of the system takes place between
the soldier and his colleagues from AK; who is going to
disclose? whom he will denounce?
A sketch of the resulting PPN is shown in Fig. 1. The struc-
ture of the relevant links between the soldiers of AK remains
unknown. One could imagine that in 1943, this structure was
yet closer to a hierarchical one, as such was the organizational
structure of underground AK structure. However, between
1946 and 1950 many high-rank AK commanders have been
already disclosed. We believe that it is more appropriate to
assume that the network topology is close to an uncorre-
lated sparse random network, as the Erdo˝s–Rényi network
(Hamilton & Pryadko 2014). The arguments are as follows:
i) in an underground army, soldiers have been hidden under
pseudonyms, what makes the network of eventual mutual
disclosures much more sparse and less clustered; ii) for the
sake of safety, in this network hubs did not appear; high-rank
officers known from their legal activities before WWII have
been quickly arrested or they managed to emigrate. Here we
add that in a more clustered network, the process of disclosure
is less likely to stop at the tree-like branch, where an agent
A may appear. Therefore, in a more clustered network the
process is even more abrupt. Yet to verify the hypothesis on
the network structure, an extensive analysis of tens thousands
of dossiers would be necessary, what remains out of the frames
of this paper.
THE DECISION TREE
The task of the construction of a decision tree includes the
formulation of the decision criteria: questions which should
be asked as to distinguish between those who are going
to make different decisions. Although the method is termed
‘qualitative’ in (Gladwin 1989), its accuracy can be evaluated
soldier
soldier
family family
OOI
soldier
OOI
soldier
OOI
family
family
OOI
Fig. 1. A personal power network (PPN) of a soldier. Directed links mark
the contextual influence of the soldier’s neighbors, family and communist
security services (OOI). The link from the subordinates is omitted for clarity
of the picture. The links from/to neighbor soldiers are left undirected, as their
bidirectional character is important here. They are of dynamic character in the
sense that we are interested in the soldier’s decisions and how the consequence
of these decisions spread along the network. On the contrary, the roles of the
family and of the OOI are fixed.
in numbers; this is the fraction of those respondents who
make the decision in agreement with what has been predicted
according to their answers for the questions.
In our case, the standard method of an evaluation of these
questions (a check of the respondents’ decisions) is very
difficult because the lag of time—even if soldiers of AK are
still alive, both their answers and their memories have been
transformed by later events. Moreover, even if the research is
conducted in late 40’s, it would be likely that an untrustworthy
pollster would get a bullet through his head. Indeed, when a
truthful answer threatens the respondent’s life, it is hard to
imagine an objective research. Yet, the same concerns several
groups in the contemporary world; to allude to these groups
is our motivation here.
According to (Gladwin 1989), the groups to be inquired
as to form the proper questions should include persons who
answer and decide in different ways. Our method here is to
replace respondents by documents; then we use both letters
between AK authorities and communist officials (Dmowski
2012), written of necessity in an official language, and de-
scriptions (Wieliczka-Szarkowa 2013) of actions of partisans
written without any censorship. Even a cursory reading reveals
a deep split between the ideas in writings and even the
languages of documents which represent the two rival political
orientations, and this split is perhaps the most important char-
acteristics of Polish political life at that time (Kersten 1991).
Despite this, our questions should be formulated in a language
which could be accepted by a respondent who could give
virtually any answer. Yet, two points make our task feasible: i)
the logic structure of the decision tree is based on the answers
‘yes’ or ‘no’, ii) the answer ‘no’ at a given level excludes
the respondent from the further investigation. The proposed
What conditions would be necessary
for you agree to disclose your activity in AK?
...
Are these conditions satisfied?
no
threat of life
yes
What about joining the party?
no
’hostile
element’
yes
Comrade X, will you work for us?
yesno
safety??
Fig. 2. The decision tree of a soldier. Subsequent levels mark the sequence of
questions and roles. The first question is descriptive; the dotted box contains
the answer with the description of a personal context. Although the role of this
box is only intermediate in the soldier’s decisions, it is placed in the tree to
mark that the dialogue could not be limited to the question about disclosure.
The outcomes are marked as ellipses. ‘Hostile element’ means being qualified
as such. The outcomes could not be expressed as payoffs, because of the lack
of information.
decision tree are shown in Fig. 2.
The relations with colleagues from AK can serve to high-
light the collective character of the process in the first two
levels of decisions: to disclose or not and to join the com-
munist party (PPR or its successor since December 1948, the
Polish United Workers’ Party) or not. This collective character
is related to the correlations between the fates of soldiers
who know each other; once X is investigated, it is likely that
he informs about his acquantances Y and Z, those in turn
inform about their neighbors etc. We should note that in the
documents signed by the AK authorities (Dmowski 2012), the
conditions of the amnesty of 1945 do not contain any demand
of revealing other persons. Despite that, the legal regulation
demanded that a soldier revealed all his subordinates (Journal
of Laws of the Republic of Poland, No. 18, It. 172 1945). Also,
during any trial the policy of the communist functionaries was
to reveal officers (Kersten 1991). As a consequence, many
disclosures snowballed. In principle, this kind of processes
can be described in terms of the percolation theory (Stauffer
& Aharony 1992). In a nutshell, consider the probability p that
one disclosed soldier informs about the other one. If p is larger
than some critical value pc, a large part of the network will
be disclosed. The actual value of pc depends on the network
topology; in uncorrelated networks, as is the Erdo˝s–Rényi one,
pc = 〈k〉/(〈k
2〉−〈k〉), where 〈k〉 (〈k2〉) is the mean (squared)
number of neighbors of a soldier in the network (Hamilton &
Pryadko 2014). The link to the percolation leads to the analogy
with modeling epidemics in networks (Kenah & Robins 2007).
Another link to simulations is the equivalence of our problem
to the N -person Prisoner’s Dilemma (Straffin 1993), which
has been investigated in various variants, e.g. (Kułakowski &
Gawron´ski 2009).
THE OUTCOMES OF DECISIONS
As an outcome of the particular decisions, the related
payoffs should be determined, and the decisions should be
evaluated by a comparison of the payoffs. However, in our case
this procedure cannot be applied for two reasons. First is that
the information of our model decision-maker is so limited that
even the probabilities of particular events cannot be evaluated
by himself. Hence, the same applies to his payoffs. Second is
that these decisions are made in the heavy condition of life
threat, and therefore the related emotions cannot be excluded.
It is likely that the strategy of a soldier is to minimize his
maximal loss (Straffin 1993).
To remain undisclosed was equivalent to suffer a continuous
fear that the partisan activity during the war would be revealed.
The risk was high: to be imprisoned, perhaps murdered, with
tough consequences also for the family. On the other hand,
those who disclosed themselves had to resist an ostracism of
those who did not (Dmowski 2012). Yet, the needs of respect
and belongingness are less fundamental than the need of safety
(Maslow 1943), and the former two are activated only if the
latter is satisfied.
Once a soldier was disclosed, his relations with his former
colleagues had been weakened, and gradually lose value. In his
plans for the future looking forward to WWIII, common at that
time in Poland (Paczkowski 2003), was replaced by a vision of
a coexistence with the communist power and institutions. Also,
in official media the gain control of PPR over PPS has been
presented as a fusion of two equivalent parties; we note that
PPS had been more socially accepted. Hence the membership
of both parties increased much at that time (in thousands:
in December 1944 PPR 34, PPS 5; in December 1947 PPR
820, PPS 713) (Kersten 1991). Those who remained non-party
could expect to be passed over in promotions, of delays in
being allotted a flat etc. When trying to remove their labels
as ‘a hostile element’, to join the ruling party seemed a most
straightforward way.
Finally, in the late 40’s there was no barriers for the activity
of OOI’s in WP (Sawicki 2008); it is only after the thaw
in 1956 that the drawing of party members into the role of
informers has been limited. Consider an ex-AK soldier, with
a dossier incriminated in eyes of the ruling power, now a
member of the communist party, untrustworthy both for his
colleagues in WP (as nobody was trustworthy there) and for
his former social environment. What are his cons and pros
if he is asked, more or less arbitrarily, by an OOI of his
unit, to contact from time to time? How could he evaluate the
risk of consequences when his answer is ‘no’? With ‘yes’, he
could count on at least neutrality of the apparently omnipotent
counter-intelligence services. On the other hand, he could hope
that his new role as NW would remain in secret. Many refused,
but not all of them. In December 1946, the proportion of NW’s
in the officer corps of WP was 1:12. In subsequent years, this
proportion has systematically increased till 1:5 in December
1949 (Tkaczew 2007). We have no data on the fraction of
the ‘hostile elements’ in this group. However, according to
the order from 9 December 1948, each NW qualified as a
hostile element had himself to be subject of an observation
(Tkaczew 2007). This indicates, that the number of those
people was at least noticeable.
THE SIMULATION
The interdependence of the probabilities of disclosing two
soldiers connected in the network makes place for an appli-
cation of statistical mechanics and simulations. If the whole
effect can be reduced to a direct influence of one soldier to
another, then the fraction of the disclosed soldiers can be found
by a direct application of the percolation theory, as a size of the
largest connected cluster (Stauffer & Aharony 1992). However,
we have also another mechanism: a soldier could disclose
himself without any relations to his neighbour colleagues.
These people activate further avalanches of disclosing soldiers,
which spread along the network ties. The proportions of these
two mechanisms remains unknown. What we can demonstrate
is the joint consequence of both of them, with their efficiencies
as the parameters of the calculation, for the network topology
assumed to be of Erdo˝s–Rényi type (Bollobás 2001). The
results are to be taken as an illustration of the discussed effects
rather than a quantitative evaluation. This kind of interpretation
remains in accordance with the famous statement of Richard
W. Hamming: ‘The purpose of computing is insight, not
numbers’ (Hamming 1973). We note on the margin that the
question most important for an individual soldier: ‘what is
the probability that I will be arrested’, has only recently been
recognized as a NP-hard problem (formulated in terms of
epidemics) (Shapiro & Delgado-Eckert 2012).
To be more specific, we assume that in our model network,
there are three kinds of soldiers. Soldiers of type A do not
disclose themselves; also, if they are disclosed, they do not
reveal what they know about their neighbours. Soldiers of
type B do not disclose themselves, but—once disclosed—they
inform about their neighbours. Soldiers of type C disclose
themselves and inform about their neighbors. These three types
are initially distributed randomly in the Erdo˝s–Rényi network
of N nodes, with their numbers NA, NB and NC , and their
fractions nA ≡ NA/N , nB ≡ NB/N and nC ≡ NC/N ,
respectively. Given NC , we ask how many soldiers will be
disclosed?
The results are shown in Figs. 3-5. Fig. 3 provides the
overall data: the fraction nD ≡ ND/N of disclosed soldiers in
the whole population. In Fig. 4, we show the same proportion
ND/N as dependent on the ratio (NC + NB)/N , with an
assumption that NC is a small number; here we put NC = 3.
The results indicate, that if the attitude of type B is frequent,
a small number of ‘spontaneous disclosers’ leads to the
disclosure of the practically whole network. Note that the
results for larger networks are more representative, because the
statistics is better. As we see, once the percolation threshold
(equal to 0.2 for the mean degree 〈k〉 = 5) is exceeded, the
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results increase very quickly, before they stabilize for longer
times. In Fig. 5, we show three trial examples of the time
dependence of the number of soldiers revealed to communist
officials.
DISCUSSION
To summarize, we argued that a reasonable agent should i)
disclose himself, ii) join the communist party, iii) accept the
role of NW. We could add one point more: try to defect to
the West, but this option is not discussed here. The results
of our simulation indicate, that once these actions have been
made in social scale, only a small part of the network of the
soldiers could remain uncontrolled by the communist power.
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Fig. 5. Three exemplary curves of the time dependence of the fraction
nD ≡ ND/N of the soldiers in the network who are disclosed for NC = 1,
for three values of (NB + NC)/N ≈ nB = 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7. The network
size is N = 1000.
This is a consequence of the ‘small-world’ property of social
networks (Bollobás 2001). The processes described above have
been understandable and they should be taken into account,
when evaluating the dynamics of social choices in Poland
between 1945 and 1949. Moreover, an interplay of incomplete
information and of threats of basic human needs is a common
component of life in (too) many current societies. The strategy
of minimizing the maximal loss seems to provide a key to
understand decisions of their members.
Two more general afterthoughts related to predictions of
social phenomena seem to be appropriate here. First is that
to predict what people will do, it is highly recommended to
contact them and try to understand the way they think. This
is not a sufficient condition, but in some circumstances the
method can be efficient. As we already noted after Christina
H. Gladwin, the accuracy of prediction can be evaluated
quantitatively. It is somewhat strange that the method is termed
as qualitative by the author of (Gladwin 1989) herself. In
this work, we substitute the direct contact with the soldiers
by analysis of documents; the historical situation at the time
was so explicit that the obtained information is sufficient.
The second thought is that predictions of social phenomena
are idiographic. A mechanical coupling of causes and effects
which could be a base for a nomotetic regularities, even if it
happens to appear, is just not interesting for social scientists.
This statement is just another way of talking about the validity
of the context.
It seems justified to say that our example is overloaded
with the context. Yet, there are two paradoxical aspects here.
On one hand, basically all what we know today about the
Soviet policy in late 40’s was clear after the famous paper by
George F. Kennan, published in 1947 (Kennan 1947). How
so many brilliant minds in West and East, not only in Poland,
could trust Stalin even much later? The answer is bitter. What
we want is not a prediction; the truth about our future could
kill us. What we want is knowledge, how to improve our
unknown future. This task needs belief and hope; both of
minor intellectual reputation, but both necessary to survive
hard times. On the other hand, the reader can ask what is the
value of a prediction if we know that our soldiers just had
no another choice? Here our answer is that it is not good to
limit the research only to very difficult examples. According
to Karl Popper, ‘the main task of the theoretical social
sciences (...) is to trace the unintended social repercussions
of intentional human actions’ (Popper 1963). Then, some
repercussions should be intended; as such, they have to be
predictable by the wide audience.
Concluding, the historical process of gaining control by a
prevailing power over opposing groups of people is discussed
in terms of percolation theory. We have mentioned political
and psychological conditions and mechanisms which made the
process inevitable. In our opinion, in some countries similar
mechanisms are active also today.
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